a b s t r a c t
The data presented in this article are related to the research article entitled "Do shareholder coalitions affect agency costs? Evidence from Italian-listed companies", Research in International Business and Finance, Forthcoming (Rossi et al., 2018) [1] . The study shows an empirical analysis using an extensive balanced panel dataset of 163 Italian listed companies for the period 2002-2013, which is a sample yielding 1956 firm-year observations. The sample consists primarily of manufacturing firms, but also includes some service enterprises. However all financial firms and regulated utilities are excluded. We collected data on ownership structure for the entire study period. Information was acquired from the Consob website and the individual company reports on corporate governance. Data on firm-level indicators (debt-to-capital ratio, firm size, and age of the firm) for all companies in the sample were collected from Datastream, Bloomberg, and Calepino dell'Azionista, as well as obtained manually from the financial statements of the individual companies being studied. Value of the data The dataset also allows one to examine the descriptive statistics of the firm-level indicators. Our dataset can be used for further studies on Italian listed companies and can be used for a comparative analysis with other common law and civil law countries, such as Spain, France, Germany, and the UK.
. Data
The data provided and explained here (Table 1) refer to independent and dependent variables used in our research. We allow a reader to see data on the three largest shareholder (OWNCONC), total debt scaled by total assets (DEBT), a proxy of agency costs (Sales-to-asset ratio), the share held by the board of directors (BOWN), firm age (LOG AGE), the size of the firms (LOG SIZE), and the shareholder type (Family firms). We calculate family-controlled firms using a dummy variable that takes a value equal to 1 if the firm is family controlled and a value 0 if the firm is not family controlled. We also show in Table 1 the methodology used to define the family controlled firm.
Moreover, our data show in the first and second columns the number of firms used in our sample (Firms) and the years investigated (Year) for each firm, respectively.
Methodology
The study adopts a dynamic panel data model involving a two-step system-GMM (Generalized Method of Moments) because it is a powerful econometric tool that captures the two components of endogeneity, namely, that which is attributable to unobservable heterogeneity and that which is associated with simultaneity. It addresses endogeneity problems through the use of a set of lagged explanatory variables as instruments for the explanatory variables.
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FIRMS
The number of firms of our sample We exclude all financial firms (SIC code 6000-6999) and regulated utilities (SIC code from 4900-4999)
YEAR
The number of years for each firm involved in our sample
